Ox cart program

This situation estimate, prepared a little less than two months before the shootdown, was intended to provide "guidance for the planning and conduct of project operations during the FY time period. The May 1, incident resulted in a halt of U-2 overflights of Soviet territory. By that time the agency's U-2 program had conducted overflights of a number of other countries and areas - including the People's Republic of China, Indonesia, and the Middle East.

It had also been used to conducted peripheral reconnaissance missions of the Soviet Union. However, this July document considered the question of whether the CIA should maintain a U-2 capability or cede the mission to the Strategic Air Command, which had been employing U-2s for nuclear air sampling and peripheral reconnaissance missions. The study explored a number of issues - including intelligence requirements, U-2 vulnerability, basing needs, and cover arrangements.

It proposed that the CIA maintain "a greatly reduced and redeployed U-2 capability. Francis Gary Powers parachuted to earth after his U-2 had been shot down and was turned over to Soviet authorities. A well-publicized trial followed and he was sentenced to 10 years "deprivation of liberty," the first three in a Soviet prison, but was exchanged in for Soviet spy Rudolf Abel.

This is one of a number of transcripts from his debriefing. Among the topics discussed are the moments before and after a Soviet surface-to-air missile detonated near his plane, bringing it, and him, down.

Source: John F. Kennedy Library. An October 14, U-2 mission provided conclusive proof that the Soviet Union was deploying medium-range ballistic missiles to Cuba. The U.

The memo, written about a month after the Soviet pledge, specifies the type of information needed from continued overflights. Not surprisingly, the first priority related to the issues of offensive weapons in Cuba. Other requirements included intelligence on Soviet activities in Cuba and the general situation in Cuba. It also expresses a U. Government preference for use of high-altitude i. U-2 overflights rather than low-altitude flights. At the time Joseph Charyk wrote this memo he was director of the National Reconnaissance Office, which had been established in September to coordinate the research and development, production, and operation of satellite and aerial reconnaissance systems used in overflights of the Soviet Union and other nations.

The memo goes on to provide a program plan for development and procurement of the modified A, designated the R The R would eventually become the SR In keeping with McGeorge Bundy's guidance from November 30, ,a substantial focus of this mission focused on intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missile sites that were at the heart of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

No military activity observed. It notes that the R program has become the responsibility of the NRO, with the responsible component designated "Program D. Zuckert, July 11, , Top Secret, 2 pp. The letter also discusses the change in security that might follow the transfer, and the circumstances that might result in such a change. Those missions began in Among the priority targets were known or suspected Chinese nuclear facilities. The apparent designation for such missions, at least in , was "Church Door.

Diary Notes, September 27, , Secret, 3 pp. These diary notes, written by Col. Joseph Carroll that he had solid information about the existence of a successor to the U This memo, reporting on a luncheon meeting of the secretaries of state and defense Rusk and McNamara , the national security adviser Bundy , and the director of central intelligence McCone , deals with both proposed U-2 and OXCART missions. Item 1 apparently deals with a proposed U-2 mission whose purpose would be to provide specific information as to when the People's Republic of China would first detonate an atomic device and reports that Rusk felt that such advance information would be of little value to him.

In and , Nationalist Chinese pilots made several attempts to fly a U-2 equipped with an infrared scanner over nuclear facilities at Baotou and Lanzhou to determine if they were active. The first two missions, conducted in , were aborted. However, mission CC, targeted on Lanzhou was conducted successfully and led to the determination that the facility was operational. This memo and its attachment, prepared by the CIA's Office of Special Activities, looks ahead to the requirements for an improved version of the U The attachment specifies 23 different characteristics the modified plane should possess.

Areas covered by the memo include, inter alia, range, altitude, maneuverability, photographic capabilities, positioning accuracy, and read-out capabilities.

A new U-2, the U-2R, with many of the characteristics specified, would become operational in Document Jack C.

From the CIA's point of view, their principal nemesis was W. Among the issues discussed are operational readiness, range, altitude, and possible utilization. A major element of the discussion concerns maintenance of a non-military covert overflight capability - while Thomas sees little utility in doing so, the author of the memos stresses high-level policy decisions in this regard as well as the Soviet Union's attempt to depict Francis Gary Powers's U-2 mission as one conducted under military auspices.

The question of the composition and, as result, management, of the U. Fischer of the Bureau of the Budget. It further discusses views of fleet size, identifies fleet reduction alternatives and the arguments for and against those alternatives, and presents recommendations. On December 28th, President Lyndon Johnson approved that recommendation and the phaseout of the fleet by January This memo represents another step in the process of turning over the advanced aerial reconnaissance mission to the Strategic Air Command.

A capability to overfly Cuba with such aircraft was to be established even earlier - in July. The reference to "SRtype aircraft" presumably allowed for SAC to employ A aircraft if SRs were not available, or considered less capable than As for a given mission.

It produced imagery of surface-to-air missile sites, air facilities, naval activities and ports, and other military targets, but produced no data indicating the presence of SCUDs. As shown in the approximate track of the mission, the plane flew to very northern portion of North Vietnam, giving it the opportunity to photograph installations across the border.

Targets photographed included depots, a railroad segment and related installations, and several military complexes. As a result of the capabilities OXCART demonstrated in its missions, presidential advisers and congressional leaders began to question the decision to terminate the program.

The CIA continued to argue that the A was the superior aircraft because it flew higher and faster and had better cameras. The Air Force contended that its two-seat SR had a superior suite of sensors, with three different cameras search, high-resolution, and mapping , side-looking radar, and ELINT collection gear.

Paul H. In late December, Nitze informed key officials of a decision to maintain the OXCART capability through June 30, but also announced plans to introduce the SR into reconnaissance operations over North Vietnam as rapidly as possible.

Joseph F. The first North Korean overflight occurred on January 26, , in response to the seizure of the Pueblo three days earlier. This memo specifies additional information in three categories jet capable airfields, naval order of battle, and ground force activity that the Pacific Command and Defense Intelligence Agency wished to see provided by a second mission over North Korea. The Pacific Command, in particular, "urgently requested" that another mission be flown - which was done on February 9.

This memo traces the management arrangement associated with the SR program from first Air Force interest to the Strategic Air Command's "the White Air Force" assumption of control of the program in July New developments in radar-absorbing materials were tried out and achieved considerable success, though not enough to solve the problem.

Various far-out designs were explored, most of them seeking to create an aircraft capable of flying at extremely high altitudes, though still at relatively slow speed. None of them proved practicable. S Eventually, in the fall of , Bissell arranged with a contractor for a job of operations analysis to determine how far the probability of shooting down an airplane varied respectively with the plane's speed, altitude, and radar cross-section.

This analysis demonstrated that supersonic speed greatly reduced the chances of detection by radar. The probability of being shot down was not of course reduced to zero, but it was evident that the supersonic line of approach was worth serious consideration. Therefore, from this time on, attention focused increasingly on the possibility of building a vehicle which could fly at extremely high speeds as well as great altitudes, and which would also incorporate the best that could be attained in radar-absorbing capabilities.

Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and Convair Division of General Dynamics were informed of the general requirements, and their designers set to work on the problem without as yet receiving any contract or funds from the government. From the fall of to late these designers constantly refined and adapted their respective schemes. S Bissell realized that development and production of such an aircraft would be exceedingly expensive, and that in the early stages at least it would be doubtful whether the project could succeed.

To secure the necessary funds for such a program, high officials would have to receive the best and most authoritative presentation of whatever prospects might unfold. Accordingly, he got together a panel consisting of two distinguished authorities on aero- dynamics and one physicist, with E.

Land of the Polaroid Corporation as chairman. Between and this panel met about six times, usually in Land's office in Cambridge.

Lockheed and Convair designers attended during parts of the sessions. So also did the Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy concerned with research and development, together with one or two of their technical advisors. One useful consequence of the participation of service representatives was that bureaucratic and jurisdictional feuds were reduced virtually to nil.

Throughout the program both Air Force and Navy gave valuable assistance and cooperation. S As the months went by, the general outlines of what might be done took shape in the minds of those concerned.

Late in November , the members of the panel held a crucial meeting. They agreed that it now appeared feasible to build an aircraft of such speed and altitude as to be very difficult to track by radar. They recommended that the president be asked to approve in principle a further prosecution of the project, and to make funds available for further studies and tests.

The president and his Scientific Advisor, Dr. James Killian were already aware of what was going on, and when CIA officials went to them with the recommendations of the panel they received a favorable hearing. The President gave his approval. Lockheed and Convair were then asked to submit definite proposals, funds were made available to them, and the project took on the code name GUSTO.

Less than a year later the two proposals were essentially complete, and on 20 July , the President was again briefed. This time he gave final approval, which signified that the program could get fully under way.

The next major step was to choose between the Lockheed and Convair designs. On 3 September , CIA authorized Lockheed to proceed with antiradar studies, aerodynamic structural tests, and engineering designs, and on 30 January gave the green light to produce 12 aircraft.

S Pratt and Whitney Division of United Aircraft Corporation had been involved in discussions of the project, and undertook to develop the propulsion system. Their J engine, which was to be used in the A, had been sponsored originally by the US Navy for its own purposes, and was to be capable of a speed of Mach 3.

Navy interest in the development was diminishing, however, and the Secretary of Defense had decided to withdraw from the program at the end of CIA's requirement was that the engine and aircraft be further developed and optimized for a speed of Mach 3. The new contract called for initial assembly of three advanced experimental engines for durability and reliability testing, and provision of three engines for experimental flight testing in early S The Primary camera manufacturer was Perkin-Elmer.

Because of the extreme complexity of the design, however, a decision was soon made that a back-up system might be necessary in the event the Perkin-Elmer design ran into production problems, and Eastman Kodak was also asked to build a camera. Minneapolis-Honeywell Corporation was selected to provide both the inertial navigation and automatic flight control system.

The Firewell Corporation and the David Clark Corporation became the prime sources of pilot equipment and associated life support hardware.

U Lockheed's designer was Clarence L. Kelly Johnson, creator of the U-2, and he called his new vehicle not A but A Its design exhibited many innovations.

Supersonic airplanes, however, involve a multitude of extremely difficult design problems. Their payload-range performance is highly sensitive to engine weight, structural weight, fuel consumption, and aerodynamic efficiency. Small mistakes in predicting these values can lead to large errors in performance. Models of the A were tested and retested, adjusted and readjusted, during thousands of hours in the wind tunnel.

Johnson was confident of his design, but no one could say positively whether the bird would fly, still less whether it would fulfill the extremely demanding requirements laid down for it. U To make the drawings and test the model was one thing; to build the air- craft was another. The most numerous problems arose from the simple fact that in flying through the atmosphere at its designed speed the skin of the air- craft would be subjected to a temperature of more than degrees Fahrenheit.

For one thing, no metal hitherto commonly used in aircraft production would stand this temperature, and those which would do so were for the most part too heavy to be suitable for the purpose in hand.

S During the design phase Lockheed evaluated many materials and finally chose an alloy of titanium, characterized by great strength, relatively light weight, and good resistance to high temperatures.

Titanium was also scarce and very costly. Methods for milling it and controlling the quality of the product were not fully developed. Of the early deliveries from Titanium Metals Corporation some 80 percent had to be rejected, and it was not until , when a delegation from headquarters visited the officials of that company, informed them of the objectives and high priority of the OXCART program, and gained their full cooperation, that the supply became consistently satisfactory.

S But this only solved an initial problem. One of the virtues of titanium was its exceeding hardness, but this very virtue gave rise to immense difficulties in machining and shaping the material.

Drills which worked well on aluminum soon broke to pieces; new ones had to be devised. The cost of the program mounted well above original estimates, and it soon began to run behind schedule. One after another, however, the problems were solved, and their solution constituted the greatest single technological achievement of the entire enterprise. Henceforth it became practicable, if expensive, to build aircraft out of titanium. S Since every additional pound of weight was critical, adequate insulation was out of the question.

The inside of the aircraft would be like a moderately hot oven. The pilot would have to wear a kind of space suit, with its own cooling apparatus, pressure control, oxygen supply, and other necessities for survival. The fuel tanks, which constituted by far the greater part of the aircraft, would heat up to about degrees, so that special fuel had to be supplied and the tanks themselves rendered inert with nitrogen.

Lubricating oil was formulated for operation at degrees F. Insulation on the plane's intricate wiring soon became brittle and useless. During the lifetime of the OXCART no better insulation was found; the wiring and related connectors had to be given special attention and handling at great cost in labor and time. S Then there was the unique problem of the camera window.

The OXCART was to carry a delicate and highly sophisticated camera, which would look out through a quartz glass window. The effectiveness of the whole system depended upon achieving complete freedom from optical distortion despite the great heat to which the window would be subjected.

Thus the question was not simply one of providing equipment with resistance to high temperature, but of assuring that there should be no unevenness of temperature throughout the area of the window. It took three years of time and two million dollars of money to arrive at a satisfactory solution. The program scored one of its most Remarkable successes when the quartz glass was successfully fused to its metal frame by an unprecedented process involving the use of high frequency sound waves.

S Another major problem of different nature was to achieve the low radar cross-section desired. The airframe areas giving the greatest radar return were the vertical stabilizers, the engine inlet, and the forward side of the engine nacelles. Research in ferrites, high temperature absorbing materials and high- temperature plastic structures was undertaken to find methods to reduce the return. Eventually the vertical tail section fins were constructed from a kind of laminated "plastic" material-the first time that such a material had been used for an important part of an aircraft's structure.

With such changes in structural materials, the A was redesignated A, and as such has never been publicly disclosed. To test the effectiveness of antiradar devices a small-scale model is inadequate; only a full-size mock-up will do. Lockheed accordingly built one of these, and as early as November , transported it in a specially designed trailer truck over hundreds of miles of highway from the Burbank plant to the test area.

Here it was hoisted to the top of a pylon and looked at from various angles by radar. Tests and adjustments went on for a year and a half before the results were deemed satisfactory. In the course of the process it was found desirable to attach some sizable metallic constructions on each side of the fuselage, and Kelly Johnson worried a good deal about the effect of these protuberances on his design.

In flight tests, however, it later developed that they imparted a useful aerodynamic lift to the vehicle, and years afterward Lockheed's design for a supersonic transport embodied similar structures. S Pilots for the OXCART would obviously have to be of quite extraordinary competence, not only because of the unprecedented performance of the aircraft itself, but also because of the particular qualities needed in men who were to fly intelligence missions.

Pilots had to be qualified in the latest high performance fighters, emotionally stable, and well motivated. They were to be between 25 and 40 years of age, and the size of the A cockpit prescribed that they be under six feet tall and under pounds in weight.

S Air Force files were screened for possible candidates and a list of pilots obtained. Psychological assessments, physical examinations and refinement of criteria eliminated a good many.

Pre-evaluation processing resulted in sixteen potential nominees. This group underwent a further intensive security and medical scrutiny by the Agency. Those who remained were then approached to take employment with the Agency on a highly classified project involving a very advanced aircraft. In November , commitments were obtained from five of the group. The small number recruited at this stage required that a second search be undertaken.

S When the final screening was complete the pilots selected from the program were William L. Skliar, Kenneth S.

Sullivan, David P. Young, Francis J. Murray, and Russell Scott. After the selection, arrangements were made with the Air Force to effect appropriate transfers and assignments to cover their training and to lay the basis for their transition from military to civilian status.

Compensation and insurance arrangements were similar to those for the U-2 pilots. U One thing to be decided in the earliest stages of the program was where to base and test the aircraft. Lockheed clearly could not do the business at Burbank, where the aircraft were being built, if for no other reason that its runway was too short. The ideal location ought to be remote from metropolitan areas; well away from civil and military airways to preclude observation; easily accessible by air; blessed with good weather the year round; capable of accommodating large numbers of personnel; equipped with fuel storage facilities; fairly close to an Air Force installation; and possessing at least an 8, foot runway.

There was no such place to be found. S Ten Air Force bases programmed for closure were considered, but none provided the necessary security, and annual operating costs at most of them would be unacceptable. Edwards Air Force Base in California seemed a more likely candidate, but in the end it also was passed over. Instead a secluded site in Nevada was finally picked. It was deficient in personnel accommodations and POL storage, and its long-unused runway was inadequate, but security was good, or could be made so, and a moderate construction program could provide sufficient facilities.

Lockheed estimated what would be needed in such respects as monthly fuel consumption, hangars and shop space, housing for personnel, and runway specifications.

Armed with the list of major requirements, Headquarters came up with a construction and engineering plan. And in case anyone became curious about what was going on at this re- mote spot, a cover story stated that the facilities were being prepared for certain radar studies, to be conducted by an engineering firm with support from the Air Force.

The remote location was explained as necessary to reduce the effect of electronic interference from outside sources. S Excellent as it may have been from the point of view of security, the site at first afforded few of the necessities and none of the amenities of life.

It was far from any metropolitan center. Lockheed provided a C shuttle service to its plant at Burbank, and a chartered D Lodestar furnished transportation to Las Vegas. Daily commuting was out of the question, however, and the construction workers arriving during were billeted in surplus trailers.

A new water well was dug, and a few recreational facilities provided, but it was some time before accommodations became agreeable. The Marginal note states: S Among the lesser snags, one existed because the laws of Nevada required the names of all contractor personnel staying in the state for more than 48 hours to be reported to state authorities.

It was generally felt that to list all these names and identify the companies involved would be likely to give the whole show away. The Agency's General Counsel, however, discovered that Government employees were exempted from these requirements. Thenceforth all contractor personnel going to the site received appointments as Government consultants, and if questions were asked the reply could be that no one but government employees were at this site.

Construction began in earnest in September , and continued on a double-shift schedule until mid One of the most urgent tasks was to build the runway, which according to initial estimates of A requirements must be 8, feet long. The existing asphalt runway was 5, feet long and incapable of supporting the weight of the A The new one was built between 7 September and 15 November and involved pouring over 25, yards of concrete.

Another major problem was to provide some , gallons of PF-1 aircraft fuel per month. Neither storage facilities nor means of transporting fuel existed. After considering airlift, pipeline, and truck transport, it was decided that the last-named was the most economical, and could be made feasible by resurfacing no more than eighteen miles of highway leading into the base. Three surplus Navy hangars were obtained, dismantled, and erected on the north side of the base.

Over surplus Navy housing buildings were transported to the base and made ready for occupancy. By early a fuel tank farm was ready, with a capacity of 1,, gallons. Warehousing and shop space was begun and repairs made to older buildings. All this, together with the many other facilities that had to be provided, took a long time to complete. Meanwhile, however, the really essential facilities were ready in time for the forecast delivery date of Aircraft No. S The facilities were ready, but the aircraft were not.

Originally promised for delivery at the end of May , the date first slipped to August, largely because of Lockheed's difficulties in procuring and fabricating titanium. One is the assembly of the wing and the other is in satisfactory development of the engine. Our evaluation shows that each of these programs is from three to four months behind the current schedule.

This news is extremely shocking on top of our previous slippage from May to August and my understanding as of our meeting 19 December that the titanium extrusion problems were essentially overcome.

I trust this is the last of such disappointments short of a severe earthquake in Burbank. Delays nevertheless persisted. On 11 September, Pratt and Whitney informed Lockheed of their continuing difficulties with the J engine in terms of weight, delivery, and performance. Completion date for Aircraft No.

Even on this last date the J would not be ready, and it was therefore decided that a Pratt and Whitney J engine, designed for the F and flown in the U-2, should be used for early flights. The engine, along with other components, could be fitted to the A airframe, and it could power the aircraft safely to altitudes up to 50, feet and at speeds up to Mach 1. S When this decision had been made, final preparations were begun for the testing phase.

In late Colonel Robert J. Support aircraft began arriving in the spring of These included eight F's for training, two T's for proficiency flying, a C for cargo transport, a U-3A for administration purposes, a helicopter for search and rescue, and a Cessna- for liaison use.

In addition, Lockheed provided an F to act as chase aircraft during the A flight test period. S Meanwhile in January , an agreement was reached with the Federal Aviation Agency that expanded the restricted airspace in the vicinity of the test area.

The North American Air Defense Command established procedures to prevent their radar stations from reporting the appearance of high performance aircraft on their radar scopes. S Refueling concepts required prepositioning of vast quantities of fuel at certain points outside the United States. Very small detachments of technicians at these locations maintained the fuel storage facility and arranged for periodic quality control fuel tests.

Movement of the full-scale S radar test model had been successfully accomplished in November , as described above. A thorough survey of the route in June , ascertained the hazards and problems of moving the actual aircraft, and showed that a package measuring 35 feet wide and feet long could be transported without major difficulty. Obstructing road signs had to be removed, trees trimmed, and some roadsides leveled.

Appropriate arrangements were made with police authorities and local officials to accomplish the safe transport of the aircraft. On 26 February , it departed Burbank, and arrived at the base according to plan. S First Flights U Upon arrival reassembly of the aircraft and installation of the J engines began.

Soon it was found that aircraft tank sealing compounds had failed to adhere to the metals, and when fuel was put into the tanks numerous leaks occurred. It was necessary to strip the tanks of the faulty sealing compounds and reline them with new materials. Thus occurred one more unexpected and exasperating delay in the program. U Finally, on 26 April , Aircraft was ready.

On that day in accordance with Kelly Johnson's custom, Louis Schalk took it for an unofficial, unannounced, maiden flight lasting some 40 minutes.

As in all maiden flights minor problems were detected, but it took only four more days to ready the aircraft for its first official flight. U On 30 April , just under one year later than originally planned, the A officially lifted her wheels from the runway. Piloted again by Louis Schalk, it took off at knots, with a gross weight of 72, pounds, and climbed to 30, feet. Top speed was knots and the flight lasted 59 minutes. The pilot reported that the aircraft responded well and was extremely stable.

Kelly Johnson declared it to be the smoothest official first flight of any aircraft he had designed or tested. The aircraft broke the sound barrier on its second official flight, 4 May , reaching Mach 1. Again only minor problems were reported. S With these flights accomplished, jubilation was the order of the day. The new Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. John McCone, sent a telegram of congratulation to Kelly Johnson. A critical phase had been triumphantly passed, but there remained the long, difficult, and sometimes discouraging process of working the aircraft up to full operational performance.

Aircraft No. Ox cart man worksheets. They gathered feathers from. He packs the birch brooms his son carved and even a bag of goose feathers from the barnyard geese. Read Ox-Cart Man as a class. Once again I decided to let them share the work because this is a LOT of cutting for small kids and children unfamiliar with using scissors are going to need some help.

Being able to retell a story is an important reading skill and a precursor to paraphrasing and summarizing. The whole family tries to guess what the job is. Activities for Ox-Cart Man. You will find 31 pages of great activities to align with the guidebook lessons.

A storytelling basket is a fun educational activity for kids. Ox-Cart Man has a logical progression that is easy to retell like these other favorite books for teaching story sequencing if you can remember all the pieces. Students will answer questions and draw conclusions. Kindergarten making connection book unit vocabulary economy donald hall draw. Common Core Lesson Ideas. The Oz Cart Man Worksheets were designed to be extremely useful to people who study everything from texts to journals to photos which use magnetic fields to attract viewers.

This story is a journey through the days and weeks the months and the changing seasons in the life of one New Englander and his family. The oxcart man packs his goods the wool from his sheep the shawl his wife made the mittens his daughter knitted and the linen they wove.

The story does not directly mention the summer season. Brainstorm activities that they do in each season of the year eg go swim-ming go fishing build a snowman plant a garden rake leaves cook out-doors etc. They read and interpret poems and respond by creating pictures of the story. Writing and illustrating some pages to tell what the ox-cart family does in the summer or retelling the story to set it in todays world.